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Abstract:  Using  the  Canadian  National  Population  Health  Survey  and  the  recent  tax 
variation across Canadian provinces, this paper examines the impact of cigarette taxes on 
smoking participation. Consistent with the literature, we find evidence of a heterogeneous 
response to cigarette taxes among different groups of smokers. Contrary to most studies, 
we find that the middle age group—which constitutes the largest fraction of smokers in our 
sample—is largely unresponsive to taxes. While cigarette taxes remain popular with policy 
makers as an anti-smoking measure, identifying the socio-demographic characteristics of 
smokers  who  respond  differentially  to  tax  increase  will  help  in  designing  appropriate 
supplementary measures to reduce smoking. 
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1. Introduction  
It is well established that tobacco use is a major cause of preventable morbidity and mortality in the 
World. The World Health Organization (WHO) [1] links five million deaths each year to tobacco use 
and by 2030 tobacco related deaths are estimated to be eight million yearly. Several studies have 
documented the health consequences of smoking; these include cardiovascular disease, cancer and 
chronic obstructive pulmonary disease (emphysema and bronchitis). The average life span of a smoker Int. J. Environ. Res. Public Health 2011, 8                 
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is reduced by 6 to 10 years [2,3]. The substantial social, economic and health costs induced by tobacco 
use have led many countries to adopt higher cigarette taxes as a policy to reduce smoking.  
While the effectiveness of cigarette taxes depends on how smokers respond to such tax increases, 
the  literature  mostly  agrees  that  cigarette  taxes  are  in  general  effective,  with  some  exceptions. 
Empirical  evidence  shows  that  certain  socio-demographic  groups  of  smokers  may  be  less  
tax-responsive than others, e.g., [4,5]. Identifying the socio-demographic characteristics of smokers 
who  respond  differentially  to  tax  increase  will  help  in  designing  additional  measures  to  reduce 
smoking. For example, for smokers with a severe self-control problem, higher cigarette taxes may only 
reduce  their  monetary  well-being,  without  affecting  their  smoking  behavior.  Evidence  about 
participation elasticities in the literature is mixed, though there is a consensus on the existence of a 
differential response to cigarette tax increase. Fletcher et al. [6] use data on adolescents from the 
National  Longitudinal  Study  of  Adolescent  Health  and  find  evidence  of  heterogeneous  price 
elasticities for tobacco use across adolescent groups. Using a latent class framework, these authors find 
that a particular group (heavy smokers) is unresponsive to cigarette taxes. 
A conventional belief among academics and policy makers is the notion that young smokers are 
more responsive to cigarette prices. This notion is grounded on the following: peer pressure effects, 
experience  of  smoking  [7],  the  short-sighted  attitude  of  the  young,  the  larger  ratio  of  smoking 
expenditure  to  disposable  income  for  the  young  versus  the  old  [8].  In  an  early  study,  Lewit  and  
Coate [9], using data from the 1976 National Health Interview Survey, find a larger participation 
elasticity for young adults than for adults over 35 years. Additional support for the inverse relationship 
between  elasticity  and  age  has  been  documented  by  some  recent  studies  [4,10-13]  (for  a 
comprehensive review, see Chaloupka and Warner [14]). Using  multiple cigarette price measures, 
Ross and Chaloupka [15] find that higher cigarette prices reduce smoking participation among high 
school students. They also find some negative price effects on smoking intensity. In a recent US study, 
Carpenter and Cook [16] find a negative and significant tax effect on youth smoking participation.  
The results of some other studies run contrary to the general belief that the young are responsive to 
cigarette costs. Chaloupka [17] find no significant price impact on young adults (ages 17–24) and 
highly educated individuals. Furthermore, he finds that individuals aged 25–64 show a significant 
long-run response to a change in price. Wasserman et al. [18] find that the elasticity estimates are 
sensitive to the inclusion of an index for smoking restriction. They find that young smokers are not 
sensitive to price increases when the restriction index is added to their cigarette demand model. Using 
the onset of smoking and discrete-time hazard models, DeCicca et al. [19] find marginal tax effects on 
youth smoking behavior. Even on theoretical grounds, the relation between age and cigarette demand 
elasticity cannot be determined a priori as there are a number of interacting and offsetting influences 
that  affect  smoking  responses  [19].  This  implies  that  the  differential  impact  of  tax  increases  on 
cigarette participation by age is an empirical issue.  
Another empirical regularity (c.f. Gospodinov and Irvine [20]) is that cigarette demand is relatively 
more elastic for low educated/income smokers than high educated/income smokers [5,21]. Gruber and 
Koszegi [21] show that individuals in the lowest income quartiles are most sensitive to cigarette prices 
and those in the highest quartile are least sensitive. They also find differences by education groups, 
with higher elasticities for low education groups. The authors also suggest that an optimal tax would 
range  from  $5  to  $10  (see  Coleman  and  Remler  [22]  for  a  view  on  equity  and  fairness  issues). Int. J. Environ. Res. Public Health 2011, 8                 
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Townsend et al. [5] find similar results using data from the British general household survey. They 
find  that  smokers  in  lower  socioeconomic  groups  are  more  price-responsive  than  those  in  higher 
socioeconomic groups. With respect to tax-response by gender, several studies find that men are more 
responsive to cigarette taxes than women, e.g., [9,23-25], while other studies find the reverse [4,26]. 
Stehr [26] showed that most US studies who find that men are more responsive to cigarette taxes than 
women  failed  to  control  for  state-specific  gender  gaps  in  smoking  rates  that  are  correlated  with 
cigarette  taxes.  He  finds  that  women  are  twice  as  responsive  to  cigarette  taxes  as  are  men  after 
controlling for gender-specific state fixed effects.  
The extant literature on the relationship between cigarette costs and smoking behavior has been 
largely US focused. Most of these studies use low cigarette prices from the post Master Settlement 
Agreement  (MSA)  era,  which  depend  on  cross-state  variation.  Consequently,  cigarette  tax/price 
estimates  may  reflect  unobserved  state-specific  sentiment  toward  smoking.  The  anti-smoking 
sentiment may be reflected in a state‘s taxes, for example tobacco producing states in the US may 
charge lower taxes. However, while this anti-smoking sentiment may be less of a concern in Canada 
given  that  there  is  no  major  tobacco  producing  province  (Gopodinov  and  Irvine  [27]),  this  study 
controls  for  provincial  fixed  effects.  For  a  review  of  the  different  ways  to  account  for  state  
anti-smoking sentiment, see Carpenter and Cook [16]. 
The  objective  of  this  paper  is  to  examine  the  impact  of  the  recent  upward  trend  in  Canadian 
cigarette  taxes  on  smoking  participation.  This  study  uses  longitudinal  data  from  the  National 
Population Health Survey (NPHS) 1998/99-2008/09. The analysis controls for individual contextual 
factors,  unobserved  heterogeneity  and  other  variables  that  influence  smoking  behavior.  The  use  
of  this  individual  level  data  allows  us  to  examine  heterogeneous  tax  effects  on  the  smoking 
participation  of  various  population  subgroups.  We  stratify  individuals  by  key  socio-demographic 
factors. To avoid having biased estimates of the impact of taxes on smoking participation, we account 
for inter-provincial differences in cigarette taxes.  
This paper contributes to the literature in several dimensions. First, using recent tax data provides 
an  update  on  the  efficacy  of  cigarette  taxes  in  altering  smoking  behavior.  Relying  on  elasticity 
estimates obtained during periods of low prices may be of limited use, given that behavioral responses 
are likely to evolve over time. Second, using longitudinal data enables the long-term impact of taxes to 
be studied. Also, observing individuals over a longer period inevitably lead to a better estimate of 
behavior than cross-sectional analysis. 
The  structure  of  this  paper  is  as  follows:  in  Section  2  we  present  a  brief  background  on  the 
theoretical literature and cigarette taxes in Canada. Section 3 describes the data and methodology. 
Section 4 presents the results and conclusions are provided in Section 5. 
2. Brief Background Literature 
Economists have formulated models to explain the rationale for addictive consumption. The general 
point of reference is the rational addiction (RA) model of Becker and Murphy (BM) [28]. In this model, 
consumers optimally make smoking decisions with knowledge of the health consequences of tobacco 
use, the addictive nature of cigarette smoking and all the monetary costs. Government intervention 
through higher taxes will necessarily make a smoker worse off in the BM model. A central assumption Int. J. Environ. Res. Public Health 2011, 8                 
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of the RA framework is time consistency, that is to say, future preferences coincide with the current 
decision to smoke.  
In contrast to the time consistent preferences in the RA model, the behavioral economics literature 
uses  hyperbolic  discounting  to  characterize  consumers‘  preferences  for  addictive  goods  as  time 
inconsistent. O‘Donoghue and Rabin [29] describe time inconsistent preferences as ‗present-biased 
preferences‘  Smokers  in  this  framework  place  a  higher  value  to  immediate  gratification,  hence, 
significantly discount the long-term negative impact. O‘Donoghue and Rabin [29,30], and Gruber and 
Koszegi [31] show how time-inconsistent behavior depends on perceived future beliefs of self-control. 
Naive agents tend to overestimate their ability to control future behavior while sophisticated agents 
fully understand future self-control problems. Due to the incentive effect, sophisticated smokers are 
more likely to refrain from smoking than naive smokers. Incentive effect here refers to a situation 
where sophisticated smokers refrain from current consumption in order to prevent future indulgence, 
see O‘Donoghue and Rabin [30] for details. 
Gruber and Koszegi [31] suggest that if smokers are sophisticated about their self control problems 
and  responsive  to  prices,  taxes  could  act  as  a  self-control  device  for  them.  They  suggest  that 
government  intervention  in  the  tobacco  market  should  not  be  limited  to  externalities  (costs  that 
smokers impose on others) but should also include smoking internalities. Self control and failure to 
attain a desired future level of smoking are the two key features that separate time-consistent from 
time-inconsistent agents.  
Hersch [32] argues that smokers‘ support for government regulations that restrict smoking in public 
areas is an indication of a lack of self control among smokers. Providing further support of the time 
inconsistent smoking model, Gruber and Mullainathan [33] find that cigarette taxes can increase the 
well-being of likely smokers. Bernheim and Rangel [34,35] argue that addictive goods can sometimes 
interfere with the decision process of the brain, and lead to wrong ‗cue-conditioned‘ cravings. Using 
taxes  when  consumption  of  addictive  goods  is  driven  by  cues  may  be  counterproductive.  The 
distributional burden of cigarette taxes will be regressive, if low income smokers have small short term 
discount factors, and progressive, if their long term discount factor is smaller [22]. 
Cigarette Taxes in Canada  
In  Canada,  cigarettes  are  taxed  at both  the  federal  and  provincial  levels.  A  key  feature  of  the 
Canadian tax system is that there is a substantial degree of variation in cigarette taxes across provinces.  
In February 1994, cigarette taxes were subject to a substantial reduction of about 50% by the federal 
government and five of the Eastern provinces, in an attempt to fight smuggling of cigarettes (for details, 
see Gruber et al. [36]). The Western provinces decided to keep taxes constant, and to fight smuggling 
in other ways. The cigarette tax in Canada was fairly stable across provinces between 1995–2000.  
The Federal Tobacco Control Strategy (FTCS) was launched by the federal government in April 
2001,  with  four  strategic  components:  protection,  prevention,  and  cessation  and  harm  reduction. 
Subsequently, cigarettes were subject to a series of tax increases as a major instrument to achieve the 
objectives of this strategy. Int. J. Environ. Res. Public Health 2011, 8                 
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The first tax increase was applied in April 2001, raising the federal excise tax to $10.65 per carton. 
In May 2001, the federal excise tax was further increased to $10.99 per carton, and by July 2002 it 
reached $15.85 per carton. Since 2002, there has been a steady small increase in the nominal excise tax 
to offset the impact of inflation on the real federal excise tax. The increase in the federal tax was 
accompanied by increases at the provincial level, but with different magnitudes. Table 1 shows the 
average real taxes by provinces between 1998 and 2008 [37]. 
Table 1. Average real cigarettes tax (in 2000 dollars) per carton for each Canadian province. 
  1998  2000  2002  2004  2006  2008 
Newfoundland  30.15  29.44  38.24  41.62  43.25  42.74 
Prince Edward  20.21  20.46  33.18  41.29  40.23  41.80 
Nova Scotia  17.15  17.54  32.41  39.63  38.74  39.43 
New Brunswick  15.85  16.28  30.05  34.12  32.76  32.41 
Quebec  14.95  16.64  29.02  31.98  30.72  30.44 
Ontario  12.65  13.42  26.61  32.27  32.79  33.35 
Manitoba  24.15  24.46  38.06  43.63  42.82  41.94 
Saskatchewan  24.95  24.85  40.05  43.47  42.51  42.15 
Alberta  22.15  21.59  39.00  40.78  38.68  40.74 
British Columbia  30.15  29.76  41.28  45.91  44.20  43.38 
Source: Provincial Department of Finance and authors‘ calculations. 
Figure 1. Average real cigarettes tax in Canada by province. 
 
3. Data Description and Variables 
The data for this study come from the Statistics Canada NPHS household component. NPHS is a 
nationally representative sample of the Canadian population which collects vital information on health 
related behavior, as well as corresponding economic and social-demographic variables. The survey 
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excludes those living on Indian Reserves and Crown Lands, full-time members of the Canadian Forces 
Bases and some remote areas of Ontario and Quebec.  
The NPHS commenced in 1994/95 with a subsequent follow up every two years. Since the first 
cycle, there have been seven follow-up surveys, and cycle 8 (2008/09) is currently available. The first 
cycle contains responses from 17,276 individuals. NPHS became strictly longitudinal from cycle 4 
(2000/01) and the first three cycles (1994/95, 1996/97 and 1998/99) have both cross-sectional and 
longitudinal components. This study uses data from cycle three (1998/99) to cycle eight (2008/09).  
The dependent variable, smoking participation, includes daily and occasional smokers. We restrict 
the  sample  to  those  12–65  years  due  to  a  potential  contamination  of  the  analysis.  The  smoking 
prevalence of the older age cohort is relatively small for this group (>65 years) and also their health 
related issues may further complicate the analysis. This study does not examine the intensity (number 
of cigarettes) of smoking, though this is available in the NPHS data set. Adda and Cornaglia [38] argue 
that intensity of smoking should be in terms of the cotinine intake level not the number of cigarettes 
smoked. These authors find that smokers exhibit compensatory  behavior by reducing quantity but 
extracting more cotinine in response to cigarette tax increase. However, NPHS does not have the 
cotinine level of smokers.  
Cigarette taxes are used instead of prices since the former ‗is a more exogenous measure‘ than the 
latter [39]. NPHS does not collect data on cigarette taxes. Historical tax data are obtained from the 
respective  provincial  tax  offices.  The  tax  rates  are  matched  with  each  respondent‘s  province  of 
residence and date of interview available in the NPHS. To obtain the real cigarette tax per carton, both 
the federal and provincial consumer price index obtained from CANSIM are used to deflate each of the 
nominal tax components .The sum of the deflated taxes is the real exercise tax in 2000 dollars. 
In addition to the cigarette tax, this study follows standard practice in the tobacco literature by using 
a number of control variables. Age has three categories: 12–24, 25–44, and 45–65 (reference category). 
Household income is represented by three dummy variables: low income (reference category), middle 
income, and high income. Gender is captured by a dummy variable (male =1, female = 0). Household 
size is family size. Studies show that macroeconomic situations can affect smoking decisions [40,41]. 
The macroeconomic environment is captured by a dummy variable (employed = 1, unemployed = 0) 
and  the  provincial  unemployment  rate.  Four  dummy  variables  represent  individual  educational 
attainment:  less  than  secondary  (reference  category),  secondary,  some  post  secondary,  and  post 
secondary. Marital  status  is  represented  by three  dummy variables: married,  separated, and single 
(reference category). Ethnicity is captured by a dummy variable (immigrant = 1, Canadian born = 0). 
Provincial dummy variables are included with British Colombia as the reference category. Health 
status is not included in the model due to a potential endogeneity (reverse causality) issue between the 
smoking decision and health status. Table 2 provides a complete definition of the variables used in  
this analysis. 
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Table 2. Descriptive statistics. 
Variable  Mean  S.D 
Smoking  0.245  0.0018 
Cigarette tax  30.350  0.0416 
Trend ( )  5.060  0.0143 
Age  37.870  0.0630 
Low_income  0.063  0.0010 
Mid_income  0.455  0.0020 
High_income  0.354  0.0020 
Male  0.500  0.0021 
Female  0.500  0.0021 
Household size  3.200  0.0059 
Employed  0.688  0.0019 
Unemployed  0.227  0.0018 
Unemployment rate  7.260  0.0086 
Less_ secondary  0.231  0.0018 
Secondary  0.125  0.0013 
Some post secondary  0.256  0.0018 
Post secondary  0.362  0.0020 
Married  0.551  0.0021 
Separated  0.095  0.0012 
Single  0.320  0.0020 
Canadian  0.852  0.0014 
Immigrant  0.146  0.0015 
Newfoundland  0.019  0.0005 
Prince Edward  0.005  0.0003 
Nova Scotia  0.032  0.0007 
New Brunswick  0.026  0.0006 
Quebec  0.255  0.0018 
Ontario  0.368  0.0020 
Manitoba  0.036  0.0008 
Saskatchewan  0.033  0.0007 
Alberta  0.106  0.0013 
British Columbia  0.119  0.0014 
N  56770   
The statistics are weighted using the NPHS sampling weights. 
Empirical Strategy 
The empirical analysis is based on the following reduced form probit specification: 
                                                                        (1)  
where     indicates  the  individual,     represents  province  of  residence,  and     represents  the  year, 
  represents smoking participation,   is a vector of other control variables including: age, income, 
gender, household size, employment status, education, marital status and ethnicity.   captures the time 
trend  of  smoking  behavior,  the  province  fixed-effect  variable,  ,  is  included  to  capture  regional Int. J. Environ. Res. Public Health 2011, 8                 
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smoking  ban  regulations  and  other  cultural  factors  that  may  be  region-specific.  In  Canada,  the 
municipal Act 2001 empowers municipalities to control smoking in public places.    represents time 
invariant individual-specific heterogeneity and     is the standard time variant residual term which is 
adjusted for clustering at the individual level. The main coefficient of interest   represents the impact 
of cigarette taxes on smoking participation. 
To  allow  unobserved  heterogeneity  to  be  correlated  with  observed  covariates,  the  unobserved 
heterogeneity  is  parameterized  using  the  Mundlak  [42]  device,  a  parsimonious  adaptation  of 
Chamberlain‘s [43] random effects probit model. Some recent studies that have used the Mundlak 
approach to account for correlated random effects include: Contoyannis and Li [44], Mentzakis [45] 
and Kjellsson et al. [46]. The unobserved effects are parameterized as: 
                     (2)  
where     controls for unobserved heterogeneity and is the within-individual means of time varying 
covariates.  Variables  included  in     are  listed  in  Table  A1.    is  assumed  independent  of    and 
distributed       
  . Substituting Equation (2) into Equation (1) depicts the effect of changing     but 
holding the time average fixed. 
4. Descriptive Statistics 
The average smoking prevalence by selected groups from 1998–2008 is reported in Table 3. The 
NPHS data used for this study contains 56,770 observations, after excluding missing observations. 
Generally,  the  average  prevalence  rate  in  Canada  has  been  declining  for  more  than  two  decades.  
Table 3 shows that the percentage of smokers is lower for those who are females, married, older, with 
high income, and more education.  
Table 3. Selected characteristics of smoking participation (in %) at each cycle, aged 12–65. 
  1998  2000  2002  2004  2006  2008  Overall 
Whole sample  28.6 (0.4)  27.4 (0.4)  24.0 (0.4)  22.5 (0.4)  21.8 (0.4)  21.2 (0.4)  24.5 (0.2) 
Male  29.6 (0.6)  29.0 (0.6)  24.4 (0.6)  23.8 (0.6)  23.8 (0.6)  23.4 (0.7)  25.8 (0.3) 
Female  27.6 (0.6)  26.0 (0.6)  23.5 (0.6)  21.2 (0.6)  19.9 (0.6)  19.1 (0.6)  27.6 (0.6) 
Age 12–24  26.1 (0.1)  26.1 (0.9)  22.4 (1.0)  18.6 (0.9)  17.5 (0.9)  17.3 (1.1)  21.6 (0.4) 
Age 25–44  32.5 (0.6)  31.7 (0.6)  27.4 (0.7)  27.8 (0.7)  27.1 (0.7)  25.1 (0.8)  28.8 (0.3) 
Age 45–65  25.5 (0.7)  24.3 (0.7)  21.8 (0.6)  20.8 (0.6)  20.0 (0.6)  20.3 (0.6)  22.1 (0.3) 
Less secondary  29.2 (0.8)  28.4 (0.8)  24.1 (0.9)  20.2 (0.9)  20.7 (1.0)  25.6 (1.2)  32.0 (0.4) 
Secondary  35.6 (1.2)  34.5 (1.3)  30.8 (1.3)  28.4 (1.4)  26.5 (1.4)  24.7 (1.4)  30.5 (0.5) 
Some post secondary  32.0 (0.8)  29.3 (0.8)  29.3 (0.9)  27.6 (0.9)  26.8 (0.9)  25.1 (1.0)  28.6 (0.4) 
Post secondary  23.0 (0.7)  23.0 (0.7)  19.7 (0.6)  19.8 (0.7)  19.6 (0.7)  18.0 (0.7)  20.5 (0.3) 
Newfoundland  30.2 (1.7)  27.0 (1.7)  26.4 (1.8)  24.6 (1.8)  20.3 (1.7)  20.0 (1.9)  25.1 (0.7) 
Prince Edward  38.1 (1.9)  34.5 (2.0)  28.0 (1.9)  26.2 (2.0)  22.5 (1.8)  18.3 (1.9)  28.5 (0.8) 
Nova Scotia  32.1 (1.8)  32.1 (1.8)  27.5 (1.8)  27.5 (1.8)  26.7 (1.8)  27.0 (2.0)  29.0 (0.8) 
New Brunswick  29.6 (1.7)  28.0 (1.7)  25.0 (1.7)  20.6 (1.7)  22.1 (1.7)  20.5 (1.9)  24.6 (0.7) 
Quebec  31.1 (1.0)  29.3 (1.0)  25.5 (1.0)  23.8 (1.0)  24.0 (1.0)  24.6 (1.1)  26.6 (0.4) 
Ontario  27.8 (0.8)  27.0 (0.9)  23.3 (0.9)  21.6 (0.8)  21.3 (0.9)  19.1 (0.9)  23.6 (0.4) 
Manitoba  29.4 (1.7)  25.0 (1.6)  21.1 (1.6)  21.8 (1.7)  20.7 (1.7)  18.5 (1.8)  23.1 (0.7) Int. J. Environ. Res. Public Health 2011, 8                 
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Table 3. Cont. 
  1998  2000  2002  2004  2006  2008  Overall 
Saskatchewan  29.3 (1.7)  30.8 (1.8)  25.0 (1.8)  25.0 (1.8)  22.4 (1.8)  22.3 (2.0)  26.2 (0.8) 
Alberta  29.0 (1.4)  29.3 (1.4)  25.5 (1.3)  24.0 (1.3)  21.1 (1.3)  21.3 (1.3)  25.2 (0.6) 
British Columbia  23.8 (1.3)  21.8 (1.3)  21.0 (1.3)  19.0 (1.3)  18.6 (1.3)  19.3 (1.5)  20.7 (0.6) 
Married  26.3 (0.6)  24.5 (0.5)  20.9 (0.5)  20.5 (0.5)  20.0 (0.5)  19.3 (0.5)  26.3 (0.5) 
Separated  44.7 (1.3)  41.8 (1.4)  37.5 (1.4)  35.0 (1.4)  34.1 (1.4)  35.1 (1.6)  44.8 (1.4) 
Single  28.0 (0.7)  28.1 (0.7)  25.0 (0.8)  28.1 (0.9)  26.7 (0.9)  22.8 (0.9)  28.0 (0.7) 
Low income  40.0 (1.3)  42.0 (1.6)  41.8 (1.7)  44.4 (2.0)  39.5 (2.3)  41.2 (2.7)  41.3 (0.7) 
Middle income  30.1 (0.6)  29.6 (0.6)  26.4 (0.6)  25.4 (0.6)  25.7 (0.7)  26.0 (0.8)  27.6 (0.3) 
High income  20.7 (0.8)  22.0 (0.8)  19.5 (0.7)  19.0 (0.7)  18.4 (0.6)  18.1 (0.6)  19.5 (0.3) 
The  average  smoking  prevalence by  selected  groups  was  obtained  from  Canada  National  Population 
Health  Survey  (NPHS)  1998/99,  2000/01,  2002/03,  2004/05,  2006/07,  &  2008/09.  The  statistics  are 
weighted using the NPHS sampling weights. Standard errors are given in parenthesis. 
The decreased proportion of Canadian smokers is larger for most of the selected groups between the 
years  2000 and  2002  and  average  real  cigarette  tax  went  up  during this  period  (see  Table  1  and  
Figure 2). It should be noted that graphic pictorial warning labels were introduced during this period in 
Canada.  However,  some  studies  show  that  pictorial  warnings  have  negligible  impact  on  smoking 
prevalence in Canada [27,47]. There is a large percentage tax increase between 1998 and 2008 across 
all Canadian provinces. This tax increase is more than 100% for all of the eastern provinces (Prince 
Edward  Island,  Nova  Scotia,  New  Brunswick,  Quebec,  and  Ontario)  that  had  about  a  50%  tax 
reduction  in  1994.  An  interesting  observation  from  Tables  1  and  3  is  that  the  provinces  of 
Newfoundland and British Columbia had the lowest percentage tax increase between 2000 and 2002; 
as well as corresponding smallest smoking prevalence decrease. It should be noted that cigarette taxes 
were already at high levels in these areas; unlike other provinces, the tax change in Newfoundland and 
British Columbia did not have a large effect on smokers because they were already tax sensitized with 
the caveat that cigarette taxes caused the decline. 
Figure  2.  Smoking  participation  by  selected  characteristics.  Source:  These  figures  are 
based on Table 1. 
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Figure 2. Cont. 
 
4.1. Estimation Results 
The smoking participation estimates are presented in Table A2. For brevity, we present results for 
the full model only for the overall sample and for relevant variables. However, the full model is 
available upon request. The results confirm the standard socioeconomic (SES) gradient in cigarette 
smoking  with  respect  to  the  income  variables.  The  higher  and  middle  income  groups  are  less  
likely to be smokers than the low income group. The education variables show some SES gradient.  
In particular, individuals with post secondary education are less likely to smoke than those with less 
than secondary education.  
The effect of marital status on smoking prevalence is negative just as the unconditional data in 
Table  3  suggest.  The  size  of  the  household  negatively  affects  smoking  prevalence.  Marriage  and 
household size effects affirm the relevance of family setting on the smoking decision. The positive 
sign of gender variable confirms the standard results that males are more likely to be smokers. Age has 
a  significant  and  negative  impact  on  smoking  participation.  Some  of  the  provincial  dummies  are 
significant. This shows that it is important to control for unobserved provincial factors that affect 
cigarette smoking. 
4.2. Cigarette Tax Results 
Since a large part of the cigarette tax is determined at the provincial level, we suspect there may be 
an identification issue with cigarette taxes when province dummy variables and year trend are included 
in the model. As a simple way of assessing the within-province variation in cigarette taxes over the 
data period, a variance inflation factor (VIF) of 6 (R
2 = 0.8334) is obtained when cigarette tax is 
regressed  on  provincial  dummies  and  trend.  The  VIF  implies  there  is  sufficient  within-province 
variation in cigarette taxes over the sample period. 
The  key  policy  variable,  real  cigarette  tax,  has  a  negative  and  significant  impact  on  smoking 
participation. Since the estimated coefficients from the probit model provide no quantitative value, the 
average partial effect and tax elasticity are also reported. Here and in what follows, our interpretation 
will focus on the elasticity estimates. The tax elasticity estimate for the whole population is −0.227. Int. J. Environ. Res. Public Health 2011, 8                 
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This result implies that if there is a 10% increase in taxes then smoking participation will fall by about 
2.3%. While this result shows that tax increases entail a modest reduction in smoking participation, 
this finding may not be a generalized response outcome for all socio-demographic groups. Though, not 
directly comparable, Sen and Wirjanto [48] examine the impact of the cigarette tax decreases that 
occurred in 1994 on Canadian youth smoking behavior. They find participation elasticities between  
−0.10 and −0.14, and initiation/persistence elasticities between −0.2 and −0.5. In the next section, we 
examine the heterogeneous tax responses of key socio-demographic groups that have been examined in 
the extant literature. 
4.3. Heterogeneous Responses 
The results in Table 4 present differential tax responses by gender, household income and self-rated 
health status. We find that the participation tax elasticity is numerically larger and significant for males. 
The elasticity for males and females are −0.322 and −0.120 respectively. As a rule-of-thumb to assess 
whether the response to tax varies significantly by gender, income, education, age and health status, we 
estimate a pooled model that includes the cigarette tax interacted with dummy variables for these 
groups. We find a significant difference for all groups except income and health status. Due to the 
small sample size of the low income group, we group income into two categories: low income category 
represents individuals in the low/middle income household and high income group are individuals in 
the high income household. We find that the low income group is more responsive to taxes than the 
high  income  group.  While  the  participation  tax  elasticity  of  the  high  income  group  
(−0.202) is larger than the low income group (−0.183), it is not statistically significant. Based on  
self-reported health status, we group individuals into two categories: low health if individuals report 
good/fair/poor health and high health if individuals report excellent/very-good health. We find that the 
high health group is more tax responsive than the low health group. While the health status is self 
assessed, maybe the high health individuals care more about their functional health. 
Table 4. Smoking participation responses to cigarette taxes by gender, income level and 
health status. 
    Gender    Income level    Health status 
    Male    Female    Low    High    Low    High 
Cigarette taxes    −0.0082 ***    −0.0028    −0.0051 **    −0.0043    −0.0051 *    −0.0073 *** 
    (0.0022)    (0.0021)    (0.0022)    (0.0030)    (0.0028)    (0.0021) 
APE    −0.0025 ***    −0.0008    −0.0017 ***    −0.0011    −0.0017 *    −0.0020 *** 
    (0.0007)    (0.0005)    (0.0007)    (0.0008)    (0.0009)    (0.0006) 
Tax elasticity    −0.3216 ***    −0.1198    −0.1829 **    −0.2017    −0.1913 *    −0.3168 *** 
    (0.0864)    (0.0881)    (0.0781)    (0.1381)    (0.1038)    (0.0932) 
N    26709    30061    32076    18153    21013    35723 
*** Significance at 1% level, ** significance at 5% level, and * significant at 10% level. Robust standard 
errors clustered at the individual level are in brackets. APE is the average partial effect. All results are 
population weighted. Low income category represents individuals in the low/middle income household 
and high income group are individuals in high income household. Low health individuals are those who 
report good/fair/poor health and high health for those who report excellent/very-good health.  
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Following DeCicca and McLeod [40], we group formal education into two groups: low education 
represents individuals with secondary education or less (high school or less) and high education is 
defined  otherwise  (greater  than  high  school).  As  expected,  the  low  educated  group  is  more  tax 
sensitive with an elasticity of about −0.41 while higher educated individuals are far less sensitive with 
an elasticity of −0.03. Though not reported, we find a tax elasticity of −0.555 for low education group 
and  −0.070  for  high  education  group  when  low  education  is  defined  as  individuals  who  did  not 
complete secondary education (high school).However, the estimation for two categories only, may 
mask  a  more  revealing  tax  effects.  We  estimate  the  tax  effects  for  the  four  different  education 
categories: less secondary, secondary, some post secondary, and post secondary (see Table 5). 
Table 5. Smoking participation response to cigarette taxes by education. 
  Four-groups    Two-groups 
  Less 
secondary   
Secondary   
Some post 
secondary 
 
Post 
secondary 
  Low    High 
Cigarette 
taxes 
−0.0135 ***
    −0.0060    −0.0005    −0.0010    −0.0106 ***    −0.0008 
(0.0036)    (0.0040)    (0.0031)    (0.0025)    (0.0026)    (0.0019) 
APE  −0.0038 ***    −0.0020    −0.0002    −0.0003    −0.0032 ***    −0.0002 
  (0.010)    (0.0013)    (0.0010)    (0.0007)    (0.0008)    (0.0006) 
Tax 
elasticity 
−0.5549 ***    −0.2179    −0.0182    −0.0422    −0.4135 ***    −0.0332 
(0.1484)    (0.1445)    (0.1176)    (0.1079)    (0.1029)    (0.0777) 
N  12807    7047    14726    20937    19854    35663 
*** Significance at 1% level, ** significance at 5% level, and * significant at 10% level. Robust 
standard errors clustered at the individual level are in brackets. APE is the average partial effect. 
All results are population weighted. Low education represents individuals with secondary education 
or less (high school or less) and high education is defined otherwise (greater than high school). 
The estimated tax elasticities for each category are as follows: less secondary (−0.555), secondary 
(−0.218), some post secondary (−0.018) and post secondary (−0.042). To study the heterogeneous tax 
effects across age groups (results reported in Table 6), we group individuals into three age categories: 
12–24,  25–44  and  45–65.  We  find  that  those  aged  45–65  are  more  responsive  to  cigarette  tax  
than those aged 12–24 and 24–44. In recent studies, using data from Youth Risk Behavior Survey 
(1991–2005) Carpenter and Cook [16] find smoking participation elasticities between −0.2 and −0.5. 
Tauras [49] examine the impact of smoke-free laws and cigarette prices on adult cigarette demand. He 
finds a participation price elasticity of −0.126. The participation tax elasticity estimates for age 45–65 
group, −0.240, is twice as large as that for age 12–24, −0.122; and 25–44, −0.114.These results are 
somewhat different from Sloan and Trogdon [11]. The authors use data from the Behavioral Risk 
Factor Surveillance System (1990–2002) to examine the impact of the Master Settlement Agreement 
on cigarette consumption for adults aged 18 and older. Though, Sloan and Trogdon [11] find that 
participation elasticity decreases with age, the estimates were not different for those aged 25–44, −0.10 
and 45–64, −0.10. They find significant elasticity estimates only for aged 18–20, −0.27; and 25–44,  
−0.10. We re-estimate our model using two age categories: 18–40 and 41–65 and the results in Table 6 
show that the age group 41–65 (−0.296) is more tax responsive than age group 18–40 (−0.015). These 
results suggest that the age group 25–40 is the least tax responsive group. Though not reported, we find Int. J. Environ. Res. Public Health 2011, 8                 
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the participation tax elasticity for aged 25–40 to be −0.075 (this is smaller for those aged 25–44 
reported in Table 5 column 3). 
Table 6. Smoking participation response to cigarette taxes by age groups (1998–2008). 
    Three-groups    Two-groups 
    12–24    25–44    45–65    18–40    41–65 
Cigarette taxes    −0.0026    −0.0031    −0.0055 **
    −0.0004    −0.0069 *** 
    (0.0043)    (0.0026)    (0.0023)    (0.0025)    (0.0020) 
APE    −0.0007    −0.0010    −0.0015 **    −0.0001    −0.0020 *** 
    (0.0011)    (0.0008)    (0.0006)    (0.0008)    (0.0006) 
Tax elasticity    −0.1217    −0.1139    −0.2404 **    −0.0153    −0.2955 *** 
    (0.1994)    (0.0960)    (0.0995)    (0.0894)    (0.0837) 
N    10910        22707    23529    28246 
*** Significance at 1% level, ** significance at 5% level, and * significant at 10% level. Robust 
Standard errors clustered at the individual level are in brackets. APE is the average partial effect. 
All results are population weighted. 
As a further robustness check, we re-estimate our model using data from 1998 to 2002 (see Table 7). 
The largest tax change occurred in most of the Canadian provinces between 2000 and 2002 (see Table 1). 
The smoking participation rate also witnessed a greater fall during this period (see  Figure 2). We 
hypothesize that the tax impact will be higher for this period. However, as expected the tax effects 
increased  in  all  the  model  specifications  with  the  exception  of  the  age  category,  25–44  which  
remain unresponsive. 
Table 7. Smoking participation response to cigarette taxes by age groups (1998–2002). 
    Three-groups    Two-groups 
    12–24    25–44    45–65    18–40    41–65 
Cigarette taxes    −0.0186 **
    −0.0012    −0.0122 **
    −0.0066    −0.0113 ** 
    (0.0081)    (0.0047)    (0.0052)    (0.0048)    (0.0044) 
APE    −0.0050 **
    −0.0004    −0.0035 **    −0.0022    −0.0033 ** 
    (0.0022)    (0.0015)    (0.0015)    (0.0016)    (0.0013) 
Tax elasticity    −0.6576 **
    −0.0352    −0.4028 **    −0.1830    −0.3697 ** 
    (0.2854)    (0.1350)    (0.1714)    (0.1332)    (0.1448) 
N    6151    13592    11322    13926    14349 
*** Significance at 1% level, ** significance at 5% level, and * significant at 10% level. Robust 
standard errors clustered at the individual level are in brackets. APE is the average partial effect. 
All results are population weighted. 
5. Conclusions  
In this paper, we examine the impact of the recent upward trend in Canadian cigarette taxes on 
smoking participation. This study uses longitudinal data from the confidential National Population 
Health Survey (1998–2008). The panel structure of this data set enables us to estimate the long-term 
response to tax changes as well as controlling for province fixed effects and unobserved individual 
heterogeneity. We find that the tax elasticity estimate for the whole population is −0.23. This means Int. J. Environ. Res. Public Health 2011, 8                 
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that if taxes increase by 10%, smoking participation will fall by about 2.3%. This result is consistent 
with a recent study (Sen and Wirjanto [48]). While this result shows that tax increases led to a modest 
reduction in smoking participation, this finding may not be a generalized response outcome for all 
socio-demographic  groups.  The  results  of  this  study  indicate  that  higher  cigarette  taxes  have  a 
differential impact on smoking participation across different groups of smokers. 
We find that the participation tax elasticity is numerically larger and significant for males. The 
elasticities for males and females are −0.322 and −0.120 respectively. This finding is consistent with 
previous studies who find that men are more responsive to cigarette taxes than women e.g., [9,23-25], 
In line with most previous studies, e.g., [5,22], we find that the low income group is more responsive 
to  taxes.  The  participation  elasticity  is  not  statistically  significant  for  the  high  income  group. 
Analogously,  the  low  educated  group  is  more  tax  sensitive  than  the  high  educated  group.  The 
differential response of low income/education smokers versus high income/education smokers raises 
the debate about the distributional impact of such taxes. While this issue remains contentious, our 
findings do not aim to resolve it, as it is beyond the scope of this study. 
The literature mostly agrees that cigarette taxes are in general effective, with some exceptions. 
Contrary to most studies, we find that the middle age group—which constitutes the largest fraction of 
smokers in our sample—is largely unresponsive to taxes. While cigarette taxes remain popular with 
policy  makers  as  a  key  anti-smoking  measure,  their  effectiveness  largely  depends  on  how  people 
respond  to  them.  Identifying  the  socio-demographic  characteristics  of  smokers  who  respond 
differentially to tax increases will help in designing appropriate supplementary measures to reduce 
smoking as there is no a ―one-size fits all‖ strategy for discouraging smoking [24]. 
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Appendix 
Table A1. Variables definition. 
Variable  Definition 
Smoking  =1 if currently a daily or occasional smoker, 0 otherwise 
Cigarette tax  =Real excise cigarette tax per carton 
Trend ( )  =Linear year trend 
Age  =age of respondents in years 
Low_income  =1 if household income is low income group, 0 otherwise 
Mid_income  =1 if household income is middle income group, 0 otherwise 
High_income  =1 if household income in high income group, 0 otherwise 
Male  =1 if gender is male, 0 otherwise 
Female  =1 if gender is female, 0 otherwise 
Household size  =Number of people living in an household 
Employed  =1 if currently working, 0 otherwise  
Unemployed  =1 if currently not working, 0 otherwise 
Unemployment rate  =annual average unemployment rate by province of residence  
Less_secondary  =1 if education is less than secondary, 0 otherwise 
Secondary  =1 if education is secondary, 0 otherwise 
Some post secondary  =1 if education is some post secondary, 0 otherwise 
Post secondary  =1 if education is post secondary, 0 otherwise 
Married  =1 if married/ living with a partner/common-law, 0 otherwise 
Separated  =1 if widowed/separated/divorced, 0 otherwise 
Single  =1 if never married, 0 otherwise (base category) 
Canada  =1 if country of birth is Canada, 0 otherwise 
Immigrant  =1 if country of birth is not Canada, 0 otherwise 
Newfoundland  =1 if province of residence is Newfoundland, 0 otherwise 
Prince Edward  =1 if province of residence is Prince Edward, 0 otherwise 
Nova Scotia  =1 if province of residence is Nova Scotia, 0 otherwise 
New Brunswick  =1 if province of residence is New Brunswick, 0 otherwise 
Quebec  =1 if province of residence is Quebec, 0 otherwise 
Ontario  =1 if province of residence is Ontario, 0 otherwise 
Manitoba  =1 if province of residence is Manitoba, 0 otherwise 
Saskatchewan  =1 if province of residence is Saskatchewan, 0 otherwise 
Alberta  =1 if province of residence is Alberta, 0 otherwise 
British Columbia  =1 if province of residence is British Columbia, 0 otherwise 
                                
Mhse_size  = within individual mean of household size variable 
Mtrend  = within individual mean of aggregate year trend 
Mmarried  = within individual mean of ‗married‘ variable 
Mseparated  = within individual mean of ‗separated‘ variable 
Memployed  = within individual mean of ‗employed‘ variable 
Munemployment  = within individual mean of ‗unemployment‘ variable Int. J. Environ. Res. Public Health 2011, 8                 
 
 
1600 
Table A2. Estimation results for smoking participation for the overall sample, aged 12−65. 
  
  
Correlated Probit Model 
Coef.  S.E.  APE  S.E. 
Cigarette tax  −0.005 ***
  (0.001)  −0.002 ***  (0.000) 
Trend (T)  0.023  (0.005)  0.001  (0.001) 
Age  −0.007 ***
  (0.001)  −0.002***  (0.000) 
Newfoundland  0.311  (0.197)  0.100  (0.068) 
Prince Edward  0.279 **  (0.132)  0.089 **  (0.045) 
Nova Scotia  0.226 ***  (0.083)  0.071 ***  (0.027) 
New Brunswick  0.085  (0.095)  0.026  (0.030) 
Quebec  0.132 *  (0.068)  0.040 *  (0.021) 
Ontario  0.060  (0.056)  0.018  (0.016) 
Manitoba  −0.016  (0.083)  −0.005  (0.024) 
Saskatchewan  0.067  (0.080)  0.020  (0.024) 
Alberta  0.070  (0.072)  0.021  (0.022) 
Male  0.115 ***
  (0.030)  0.034 ***  (0.009) 
Married  0.145 ***  (0.041)  0.042 ***  (0.012) 
Separated  0.245 ***
  (0.053)  0.077 ***  (0.017) 
Secondary  0.183 ***  (0.052)  0.056 ***  (0.017) 
Some post secondary  0.104 ***  (0.040)  0.031 ***  (0.012) 
Post secondary  −0.134 ***  (0.041)  −0.039 ***  (0.012) 
Mid_income  −0.041  (0.026)  −0.012  (0.007) 
High_income  −0.235 ***  (0.032)  −0.068 ***  (0.009) 
Employed  0.322 ***  (0.022)  0.091 ***  (0.006) 
Unemployment rate  0.002  (0.008)  0.000  (0.003) 
Household size  −0.037 ***  (0.010)  −0.011 ***  (0.003) 
Immigrant  −0.280 ***  (0.051)  −0.077 ***  (0.013) 
Mhse_size  −0.014 ***  (0.019)  −0.027 ***  (0.005) 
Mtrend  −0.067 ***  (0.013)  −0.019 ***  (0.004) 
Mmarried  −0.079  (0.069)  −0.023  (0.021) 
Mseparated  0.276 ***  (0.097)  0.0821 ***  (0.028) 
Memployed  −0.047  (0.052)  −0.014  (0.015) 
Munemployment 
Tax elasticity 
−0.024 
−0.227 *** 
(0.018) 
(0.062) 
−0.007 
 
(0.005) 
 
N  56770 
      *** Significance at 1% level, ** significance at 5% level, and * significant at 10% level.  
S.E is robust standard errors clustered at the individual level. APE is the average partial 
effect. All results are population weighted. 
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